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Infringement of the Exclusive Right to Prepare
Derivative Works: Reducing Uncertainty
The Copyright Act of 1976 grants to all copyright holders
an exclusive right to prepare derivative works.1 Some courts
require that a derivative work prepared by a person other than
the copyright holder be "substantially similar" to the preexist-
ing work in order to find infringement of the copyright holder's
right.2 The "substantial similarity" requirement does not serve
the purposes of copyright law because it is too vague and pro-
vides copyright owners no predictability regarding the scope of
protection,3 especially in cases involving computer software.
Courts therefore need to reevaluate the use of the substantial
1. The relevant portion of the exclusive rights section of the Copyright
Act of 1976 states:
"Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this ti-
tle has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare de-
rivative works based upon the copyrighted work; ...." Copyright Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
The above rights are referred to as the § 106(1) and § 106(2) rights, respec-
tively.
A derivative work is defined as "a work based upon one or more preexist-
ing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictional-
ization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added). The Copy-
right Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, did not contain the emphasized lan-
guage; therefore, only specific works such as books and music were protected
by the right to prepare derivative works. See Note, Derivative Works and the
Protection of Ideas, 14 GA. L. REV. 794, 798 n.29 (1980).
The term work is the general term to describe copyrightable subject mat-
ter, and will be used hereinafter with respect to all the copyright acts even
though the term did not arise until the 1909 Act. See infra notes 18-20 and ac-
company text. The term author also will be used synonymously with copy-
right holder.
2. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267-68 (5th
Cir. 1988) (refusing to find infringement of § 106(2) without a showing of sub-
stantial similarity); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that substantial similarity is required to prove infringement of both
§ 106(1) and § 106(2)), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
A respected authority follows this interpretation and states that § 106(2) is
"superfluous" because it will not be infringed unless the exclusive right of re-
production is infringed. 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.09[A (1988) [hereinafter NIMMER].
3. See infra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
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similarity test for infringement of the exclusive right to pre-
pare derivative works.4
This Note proposes a test for infringement of the exclusive
right to prepare derivative works that will reduce the present
uncertainty. Part I traces the legislative and judicial back-
ground of the exclusive right to prepare derivative works in the
context of changing technology. Part II analyzes the traditional
"substantial similarity" test for infringement as applied to a
computer software author's exclusive right to prepare deriva-
tive works, and shows how the test fails to serve the purposes
of copyright law because of its uncertainty. Part III proposes a
test for infringement of the exclusive right to prepare deriva-
tive works that incorporates a market analysis. The Note con-
cludes that copying of minimal portions of the source code of a
copyrighted computer program should be an infringement of
the exclusive right to prepare derivative works.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO
PREPARE DERIVATIVE WORKS
A. TECHNOLOGICAL AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN COPYRIGHT
The Constitution gives Congress authority to pass laws that
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'5 Copyright
laws serve that purpose by granting authors certain exclusive
rights that provide incentive to create new works while afford-
ing the public access to the resulting creativity. 6 Congress and
the judiciary have struggled to define the nature and extent of
4. The exclusive right to prepare derivative works has drawn attention
from other commentators. See Brown, The Widening Gyre: Are Derivative
Works Getting Out of Hand?, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1984) (pro-
posing limitations on exclusive right to prepare derivative works); Goldstein,
Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y
U.S.A. 209, 227 (1983) (discussing difference between exclusive right to prepare
derivative works and exclusive right of reproduction).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause is the basis for copyright law
and for patent law. Patent and copyright once were thought to be mutually
exclusive, but this theory is eroding as new technology proliferates. See Samu-
elson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of
the Chip Law to the Computer Programs Act, 70 MINN. L. REv. 471, 529 (1985)
(noting that protection afforded semiconductor chips breaks down this
exclusivity).
6. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 545-46
(1985) (noting copyright law purposes of increasing public knowledge and giv-
ing original contributors a "fair return for their labors"); see also Abrams, The
Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of
Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1119, 1185 (1983) (stating "the un-
derlying purpose and philosophy of the Copyright Clause is to benefit the pub-
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these exclusive rights in order to insure the optimum benefit to
society.7 The least understood of these exclusive rights is the
right to prepare derivative works,8 otherwise known as the
right to prepare adaptations.9
The first copyright act did not give authors an exclusive
right to prepare derivative works, but rather, only granted au-
thors the exclusive right to copy and sell maps, books, and
charts.'0 Authors soon found that this law failed adequately to
protect their creative efforts because others were free to make
derivative works, such as translations, of any copyrighted
work." Congress responded to the authors' concerns by enact-
ing the Copyright Act of 1870.12 This Act included exclusive
rights to dramatize and translate works of authorship,' 3 and ex-
tended the scope of copyrightable subject matter to include
plays, music compositions, paintings, and sculptures.' 4 Con-
lic by providing an economic incentive to authors in the form of limited
monopoly control over the commercial exploitation of their works").
7. Under current law, an author has the exclusive right to reproduce,
adapt, distribute, perform, and display the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1982).
8. Compare Brown, supra note 4, at 3 (arguing that extension of deriva-
tive works protection has gone too far) with Goldstein, supra note 4, at 227
(arguing that exclusive right to prepare derivative works should protect more
than exclusive right of reproduction).
9. "Adaptations" is a carryover from previous statutes, and is preferred
by some commentators. 2 NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.09 (calling adaptation
right the right to make derivative works). Hereinafter, the terms adaptation
and derivative work will be used interchangeably.
10. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 124, 124-25. The main con-
cern of copyright at that time was protecting the physical article, because the
copyright was thought to be in the physical object, not in the author. See Note,
supra note 1, at 796. No right of adaptation existed because there could be no
infringement absent exact copying of the book, and adaptations, by definition,
require some addition or change to the existing work. Id.
11. See, e.g., Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 205 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No.
13,514) (holding that translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin into German is not
copyright infringement); Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 175 (C.C.D. Ohio
1847) (No. 13,497) (finding abridgment of copyrighted work is not
infringement).
12. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
13. The Act stated that "authors may reserve the right to dramatize or to
translate their own works." Id. It is curious that Congress did not include a
right of abridgment, given the holding in Story. Congress did not define
abridgments as derivative works until the 1909 Act. See infra notes 18-19 and
accompanying text.
14. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212. This extension of the
scope of copyrightable subject matter is important when considering the exclu-
sive right to prepare derivative works. As the subject matter of copyright
changes, so will the scope of protection, as evidenced by the major amend-
ments to the copyright law. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. The
1989] 1523
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
gress concluded that the benefit society received by extending
authors a monopoly over dramatizations and translations of
their works outweighed the costs of restricting access to the
copyrighted works.15
The question of the proper incentive for authors in light of
the need for public access arose again as technological advances
strained the 1870 Act.16 For example, the invention of the mo-
tion picture and player piano created opportunities to prepare
derivative works of books and songs that the 1870 Act had not
contemplated.' 7 Congress responded with the Copyright Act of
1909,1s which contained broad language allowing copyright law
to adapt to new technologies that created new ways to use liter-
ary works. The Act stated that one could not copy a literary
work "or make any other version thereof."' 9 The Act covered
any new technology that allows adaptation of a literary work
into a new medium.20
subject matter of copyright affects the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works because a new copyrightable work also may be an infringing derivative
work. See Oman, 1976 Copyright Act Revision Revisited, 34 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 29, 30 (1980) (noting that Congress had to revise copyright law to
"accommodate such new technological wonders as motion pictures and sound
recordings"); infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
15. The 1970 Act demonstrates how Congress reacts to changes in technol-
ogy by amending the exclusive right to prepare derivative works. This process
is necessary to preserve the incentive of authors. See infra note 16.
16. Technological innovation is a problem that will always affect copy-
right law. See Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, 414 U.S. 417, 430 (1983) (stating
that change in copyright law is stimulated by new technology). It has been
stated that .'[i]n no branch of the law other than copyright has the incidence
of new technologies revealed so many gaps and deficiencies for which the rem-
edy can only be regulation and supervision [by the legislature].'" Lahore, Re-
prography Reproduction, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: THE CHALLENGE TO
COPYRIGHT (J. Lahore ed. 1984) (quoting Comment on the Review of Audiovi-
sual Copyright Law in Australia, 56 AUsTL. L.J. 621, 622 (1982)); see also Ladd,
Securing the Future of Copyright: A Humanist Endeavor, 9 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 413, 414 (1985) (stating that legislative action is response to technological
change).
17. See, e.g., Kallem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62 (1911) (discussing
adaptation of movie); White Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (finding no infringement of musical composition by player-
piano music roll); see also B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 34-
39 (1967) (discussing Supreme Court's struggles to answer problems posed by
motion picture and player-piano music roll).
18. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075. The Act specifically covered translations, dra-
matizations, conversions into novels, adaptations for musicals, and designs for
works of art. Id. The invention of television is an example of how this broad
exclusive right to prepare derivative works functions. See Bradbury v. Colum-
1524 [Vol. 73:1521
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The next major revision in copyright law, the Copyright
Act of 1976, again expanded both the scope of copyrightable
subject matter and the set of exclusive rights an author ob-
tained upon copyrighting a work.21 Whereas the 1909 Act
granted only authors of literary works the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works, the 1976 Act extended that broadly
defined right to authors of all works.22 Thus, the exclusive
right to prepare derivative works applies to technologically ori-
ented works, such as computer software, as well as to literary
works. Extending to authors of technological works a monop-
oly over derivative works, however, poses a difficult balancing
problem. Because technological progress requires inventors to
use existing technology as "stepping stones" to new innovation,
copyright in a technological context must carefully balance the
need to encourage creative output by granting authors exclu-
sive right to their creations against the need to ensure the ex-
ploitation of that new technology.23 Any protection given to
technological works must take into consideration the height-
bia Broadcasting System, 287 F.2d 478, 484 (9th Cir.) (discussing process of
adapting literary work to television), cerL dismissed, 368 U.S. 801 (1961).
21. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The Copyright Act of 1976 is the cul-
mination of an extensive revision process that began in the early 1960s. See
generally A. KAMINSTEIN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT: A COMPENDIUM
AND ANALYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF
1976 xxxv-xlvii (1985) (listing calender of events leading to Copyright Act of
1976). The 1976 Act was the origin of much of the current terminology, such
as derivative work Copyright Act of 1976, § 101, 90 Stat. at 2542 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
Derivative work is:
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a transla-
tion, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion pic-
ture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annota-
tions, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work".
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
22. The statute gives examples of derivative works such as translations
and motion picture versions. Id These examples, however, refer to traditional
works such as books, plays, and songs. What constitutes a derivative work of
new works such as computer programs, which is covered by the language "or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted" is
unclear and must rely on some interpretation of the statutory terms based
upon. Id; see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
23. See Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modifi-
cation of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1292-94 (1984)
(arguing that software protection needs to be reevaluated because of special
need for using programs as "stepping stones" in progress).
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ened potential for inhibiting the innovation process.24
Congress placed the burden of defining this balance on the
courts by broadly defining a derivative work as any work
"based upon" a preexisting work.25 The courts have attempted
to interpret based upon in a manner that preserves the incen-
tive for authors and, at the same time, promotes the innovative
process.26
B. ALTERNATE DEFINITIONS OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO
PREPARE DERIVATIVE WORKS
Since passage of the 1976 Act, two different applications of
the exclusive right to prepare derivative works have emerged
from the courts.2 7 One application of this exclusive right con-
24. See R. Nimmer & P. Krauthaus, Copyright and Software Technology
Infringement Defining Third Party Development Rights, 62 IND. L.J. 13, 38-
39 (1986) (issuing caveat against extending too much protection to software be-
cause of possible chilling effect on developers from examining earlier work).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The closest thing to a definition of based upon
is provided in the House Report, which states "to constitute a violation of sec-
tion 106(2) . . . the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the copy-
righted work in some form. .. ." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE. CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5675.
26. See Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of Com-
puter Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L. REV. 563, 572 (1985) (discussing
problems courts have had in interpreting exclusive right to prepare derivative
works); supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
A source of the courts' inconsistent interpretations is the difficulty of
adapting copyright law to new technology. The Copyright Act of 1976 man-
dated that courts grant protection when technological advance made it neces-
sary. See HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REvISION: PART 6, at 13-14 (1976) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (stating
that basic approach of bill was to create broad rights to be adapted to new
technological advances); see also Ladd, supra note 16, at 416 (stating that 1976
Act was drafted in broad language to avoid constant amendments). Computer
software is an example of new technology that Congress needed to address in
the 1976 Act. See, e.g., Data Cash Systems v. JS&A Group, 480 F. Supp. 1063,
1067 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (citing need for definitive legislative solutions to computer
uses of copyrighted works), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980); Synercom
Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (N.D.
Tex. 1978) (involving statistical analysis computer programs).
27. These two interpretations are basically illustrated by the positions
taken by Professors Brown and Goldstein. Professor Brown advocates restrict-
ing the exclusive right to prepare derivative works. See Brown, supra note 4,
at 10. Professor Goldstein advocates interpreting the exclusive right to pre-
pare derivative works to protect markets beyond that of the original work. See
Goldstein, supra note 4, at 227. Goldstein does not, however, seem to go as far
as the court in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.) (dis-
cussed infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823
(1983), because Goldstein still follows a "substantial similarity" analysis. Gold-
stein, supra note 4, at 231; infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. This Note
1526 [Vol. 73:1521
COPYRIGHT
centrates on the economic effect of the alleged infringing deriv-
ative work.28 The other application equates the term based
upon with the traditional substantial similarity test.29
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic International, Inc.30 applied the
market-based definition of the exclusive right to prepare deriv-
ative works. One copyrighted work in Midway was the video
game "Galaxian." 31 The alleged infringing work was a speeded-
up version of "Galaxian" produced by defendant's circuit
board.32 The Midway court found that the speeded-up version
of "Galaxian" infringed Midway's exclusive right to prepare de-
rivative works.3 3 It held that the exclusive right to prepare de-
rivative works grants authors a limited monopoly in all
markets related to the work that generate a significant de-
mand.34 The court illustrated this point by contrasting the
speeded-up video game, which generated a large demand, with
a speeded-up phonograph, which will not generate a large de-
adopts an analysis of the exclusive right to prepare derivative works that is
similar to Midway.
28. See Midway, 704 F.2d at 1013-14 (finding infringement of § 106(2) by
electronic circuit board that speeded up copyrighted video game). Other courts
also have stressed the demand generated by the copyrighted work. See, e.g.,
Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 n.12
(7th Cir.) (stating that derivative right may be more valuable than original
work), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571,
579 (D. Mass. 1985) (finding computer program infringed copyright in book
upon which it was based); see also Goldstein, supra note 4, at 227 (discussing
investment effects of derivative works). Other courts have indicated that the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works differs from the exclusive right of
reproduction. See Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740
F.2d 718, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1984) (interpreting 1909 Act as prohibiting remixing
of Lone Ranger scripts for radio play without discussing substantial similar-
ity); SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Systems, 605 F. Supp. 816, 830 (M.D. Tenn.
1985) (finding that "based upon" is broader than "substantially similar").
29. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267-68 (5th
Cir. 1988) (equating "based upon" with "substantial similarity"); Litchfield v.
Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to find that movie E.T
infringed play absent substantial similarity), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985);
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d. Cir.) (finding
that work is not derivative unless it has been copied substantially from an-
other work), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); see also 6 NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 8.09[A] (requiring substantial similarity to infringe § 106(2)). The courts that
require "substantial similarity" do not discuss the economic impact that the
non-similar work will have on the original work. See Vault, 847 F.2d at 267-68;
Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1354-56; Reyher, 533 F.2d at 90.
30. 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
31. Id. at 1010.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1013-14.
34. Id.
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mand.35 A speeded-up phonograph would not be a derivative
work because the author would have little incentive to produce
it due to the small demand.36 Thus, one definition of a deriva-
tive work focuses on its economic impact on the market of the
preexisting work.37
Other courts declined to examine the economic impact of
the derivative work, and instead focused on whether the works
are "substantially similar."38 Works are "substantially similar"
when an ordinary observer finds that the alleged infringing
work incorporates an "illicit" or "unlawful" amount of the pre-
existing work's expression.39 Traditionally, the jury performed
this examination from the standpoint of an "ordinary observer"
by comparing the two works and making a subjective determi-
35. Id. at 1013.
36. Id.
37. Id. The analysis of Midway has been dubbed "offensive derivative
work" theory. Conley & Bryan, supra note 26, at 611 n.342. Plaintiffs in Mid-
way have been the only ones to succeed in getting a court to give a broad read-
ing to § 106(2). Cf Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Systems, 658 F.
Supp. 351, 355 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (following Midway but finding substantial sim-
ilarity as well). Other cases have found infringement, but have involved sub-
ject matter that is more traditional. See Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v.
Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1984) (involving re-mixing
of scripts); Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296, 1298 (D.D.C. 1985) (involving
translation of book). The biggest deterrent has been the requirement of sub-
stantial similarity. Litigants are probably hesitant to raise the "offensive de-
rivative work" issue because of the possibility of creating the perception of a
weak case.
38. See supra note 29.
39. An attorney can prove copying either through direct evidence of copy-
ing, which is very rare, or circumstantially by proving that the defendant had
access to plaintiff's work and that the works are substantially similar. Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th
Cir. 1977). Access is not necessary if there is striking similarity. The substan-
tial similarity test is really a bifurcated test that first determines, with the aid
of expert testimony, whether the defendant copied the idea of the work. Id. at
1163-65. The court allows expert testimony, or extrinsic examination, at this
stage because an ordinary observer initially may not see the similarities. The
second, or intrinsic, step of the test is whether an ordinary observer would
find that the expression of the work was copied. Id. The intrinsic part of the
test is designed to inject a subjective element into the substantial similarity
analysis. Traditionally, courts have limited expert testimony in determining
substantial similarity to preclude plaintiffs from dissecting the works to find
irrelevant similarities. In the computer software context, however, expert tes-
timony has proven to be very useful. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
The bifurcated test has been rejected in the computer software context by
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987), because of the complexities of com-
puter software. The substantial similarity test outlined here follows the Whe-
lan example.
[Vol. 73:15211528
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nation of whether the works are substantially similar.40 For
books, music, and other traditional copyright works, this
method works well, but in the case of computer software, the
"ordinary observer" is unable to make such a comparison be-
cause of the technical nature of software.41 Derivative works
exacerbate this problem because a derivative computer pro-
gram may be in a different computer language from the origi-
nal.42 Thus, expert testimony is generally admitted to aid the
jury in determining substantial similarity.43 Because substan-
tial similarity is a qualitative as well as a quantitative test,44 the
expert points out whether the parts that are "copied" are im-
portant or crucial parts of the program. The jury then exam-
ines this evidence from the standpoint of the ordinary observer
to determine whether the work is an infringement. 45
The substantial similarity test is complicated further by the
rule that there must be "substantial similarity" to both the
"idea" and the "expression" of the copyrighted work.46 This
40. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232-33 (discussing the "ordinary observer"
test as applied to computer software).
41. Id.; see also Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A
Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1285-88
(1984) (arguing that expert testimony should control determination of in-
fringement in computer software cases).
42. Some courts have compared a computer program in a different lan-
guage to a foreign language translation of a book. Williams v. Arndt, 626 F.
Supp. 571, 576 (D. Mass. 1985). The Williams court thought they were analo-
gous because both processes were simply mechanical, involving neither crea-
tivity nor originality. Id. It is questionable whether this analogy applies,
because the skill and expertise involved in writing a computer program is
much greater than the court intimated. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230 (discuss-
ing discretion and skill programmer must use in designing program). The pro-
gramming process is not a simple retyping of the original program, but rather
involves a distillation of the program into a general problem to be solved and
then breaking that problem down into statements understandable by the com-
puter. Id; see also id. at 1229 n.14 (citing sources that generally discuss process
of computer programming).
43. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1228-31 (discussing expert testimony);
Atari, Inc. v. Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 n.12 (7th Cir.) (stating
that by not allowing expert testimony to elucidate differences in works, courts
may deprive authors of their derivative works right), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982); SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 818 (M.D. Tenn.
1985) (appointing expert to aid court in analyzing software case); see also Con-
ley & Bryan, supra note 26, at 581-84 (discussing substantial similarity test for
infringement as applied to software cases).
44. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1245.
45. See supra note 40.
46. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). The Copyright Act of 1976 codified the rule
against protecting ideas in § 102, which states: "In no case does copyright pro-
1989] 1529
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doctrine, sometimes referred to as the idea/expression dichot-
omy, is one of the most difficult doctrines for courts to under-
stand and apply consistently.47 Perhaps the difficulty in
defining the terms idea and expression stems from the fact that
the idea/expression dichotomy is simply a reflection of the un-
derlying rationale of copyright law.48 Generally, copyright law
grants an author a limited monopoly over the expression of the
work in return for the author's contribution of the idea of the
work to the public domain. 49 The monopoly over the expres-
sion provides the author with an incentive to create original
works, and at the same time allows others to use the idea as a
stimulus to create new works without danger of infringement.
Thus, defining idea and expression entails the difficult policy
judgment of balancing incentive to authors against the need to
allow society to build on the work.50
Judge Learned Hand made one of the first attempts at
clarifying the idea/expression dichotomy with his now infa-
mous "abstractions test."51 The abstractions test defines the
boundary between idea and expression as lying at a level of ab-
straction where the specific details of the work are lost, and the
general description of the work-the idea-remains. 52 Even
tection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Copy-
right Act of 1976, § 101, 90 Stat. 2545 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982)).
47. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234-35 (discussing idea/expression di-
chotomy and its inherent difficulties); Krofft, 562 F.2d 1157, 1163-65 (same);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (same), cert
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); see also Conley & Bryan, supra note 26, at 572
(stating that defining idea/expression dichotomy has been one of most difficult
problems in copyright law).
48. One of the first uses of the idea/expression dichotomy to effectuate
the policy of copyright laws occurred in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03
(1879).
49. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234-35 (stating that purpose of copyright
law is to create most efficient balance between protection and dissemination);
see also Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual
Property Rights in Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright Protection,
the Evolving Concept of Derivative Works, and the Proper Limits of Licensing
Arrangements, 20 U. DAVIs L. REV. 105, 113 (1986) (stating that
idea/expression dichotomy reflects balance between incentive to authors and
access to public).
50. The difficulty of this policy judgment is reflected by the many amend-
ments the copyright law has undergone since its creation. See supra notes 10-
24 and accompanying text.
51. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
52. Id.
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Judge Hand recognized the vagueness of the abstractions test,
and stated that distinguishing idea from expression is necessar-
ily an ad hoc determination.53
As stated earlier, the idea/expression dichotomy is an in-
herent part of the substantial similarity test. One can appropri-
ate the idea of a copyrighted work with impunity; copyright
infringement exists only when one appropriates the expression
of the work.54 Because the idea/expression inquiry is so vague,
however, an "ordinary observer," even with expert testimony,
will have difficulty knowing precisely what similarity consti-
tutes infringement.55 When technological subject matter and
derivative works further complicate the problem, even the
most sophisticated observers may become confused.56 This in-
herent vagueness in the substantial similarity test results in a
wide disparity of protection for computer software, especially in
cases involving derivative works.57
The most recent case involving computer software and a
claim of infringement of the exclusive right to prepare deriva-
tive works is Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.58 In Vault,
53. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960).
54. See supra note 46.
55. See Note, supra note 1, at 799-800 (pointing out that idea/expression
dichotomy is often just label for result rather than aid in decision process).
56. This conclusion is supported by the result in Whelan, which has been
criticized for its application of the idea/expression dichotomy to find infringe-
ment. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 5, at 526 n.257 (arguing that Whelan
extends too much protection).
57. Compare Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238-40 (finding that overall structure
and organization of computer program is protectable expression) and SAS
Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding
that structure of computer program is protectable expression) with Synercom
Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013-16 (N.D.
Tex. 1978) (refusing to protect general data structure) and Q-Co Indus. v.
Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (refusing to follow SAS).
58. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). Vault did not make the traditional claim
of infringement of the exclusive right of reproduction, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)
(1982), but rather concentrated on the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works, id. § 106(2). Copying claims are by far the most common copyright
claims, especially in a historical context. Prior to the passage of the Copyright
Act of 1976 and the corresponding change in the scope of the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works, very few plaintiffs alleged violation of the exclusive
right to prepare derivative works. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying
text. Often this was a result of error by the plaintiff in failing to include
§ 106(2) in the complaint. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1228 (finding infringe-
ment of computer program in another language, but not using right to prepare
derivative works); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 217, 221-26 (D.N.J. 1977) (discussing derivative nature of alleged infring-
ing index, but not raising § 106(2)).
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the plaintiff designed a computer program that "protected"
other computer programs from software pirates.59 Sellers of
software copied Vault's program onto a floppy diskette along
with an application program, such as a word processor or
spread sheet.60 Vault's program precluded users from making
more than one copy of the application program.61 Users want
to make multiple copies of the programs they buy and a high
demand therefore existed for a program that could "unlock"
diskettes protected by Vault's program.6 2 Quaid Software, the
defendant, designed just such a program.6 3
In designing its program, Quaid Software incorporated
thirty characters of Vault's copyrighted source code into the
"unlocking" program.64 Vault argued that those thirty charac-
ters were essential to the operation of the program and there-
fore constituted a qualitative "substantial similarity. '6 5 The
Vault court rejected this argument and found that because the
two programs served different functions, the qualitative simi-
larities were irrelevant.6 6 The court concluded that there is no
infringement of the exclusive right to prepare derivative works
unless the alleged derivative work is substantially similar to the
original.67
The Vault court relied on the substantial similarity test,
probably because of its wide acceptance in cases involving
claims of copying or infringement of the exclusive right of re-
production.68 The analysis in Vault ignores the fact that deriv-
59. Vault, 847 F.2d at 256.
60. Id.
61. Id
62. Id.
63. Id. at 257.
64. Id
65. Id. at 267.
66. Id. at 268.
67. Id,
68. Id. at 267-68; see supra note 2. The Vault court relied without analysis
on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985), to find support for its holding.
Vault, 847 F.2d at 267. The Litchfield court found that the movie E.T - The
Extraterrestrial (Universal City Studios 1982) was not an infringing derivative
work of plaintiff's copyrighted play, because the two were not substantially
similar. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357. Litchfield is the first case to directly hold
that the substantial similarity test applies to the exclusive right to prepare de-
rivative works. Nonetheless, the court did not deem it necessary to analyze
whether its nullification of the exclusive right to prepare derivative works
strikes the proper balance between incentive to authors and public access. The
Litchfield court simply concluded that the amended exclusive right to prepare
derivative works was not intended to dramatically expand copyright protec-
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ative works necessarily differ in form from the original and,
therefore, strict application of the substantial similarity test
may not be appropriate in derivative works cases.69
Q-Co Industries. v. Hoffman 70 provides another example of
the difficulty in deciding derivative works cases involving com-
puter software by applying the substantial similarity test.71 In
Q-Co, the plaintiff wrote a computer program that converted an
Atari computer into a teleprompter for television and theatrical
productions.72 The defendant used the plaintiff's program to
produce a competing program that ran on an IBM professional
computer.7 3 Because the programs were written for different
hardware, they were very dissimilar.74
The Q-Co court recognized that derivative works are inher-
ently dissimilar, and found that regardless of these dissimilari-
ties, the defendant's program still could be an infringing
derivative work.75 The court stated that because a derivative
work includes a "modification which, as a whole, represents an
original work of authorship," the alleged infringing work can
tion. 1d, This conclusion was persuasive to the court in Berkic v. Creighton,
761 F.2d 1289, 1292-94 (9th Cir.) (following Litchfield without discussion), cert
denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
By following Litchfield, the Vault court nullified the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works for technological works as well as works of fine art.
Given the differences between technological works and works of fine art, this
conclusion is questionable. See Conley & Bryan, supra note 26, at 610 n.338
(questioning Litchfield's rationale). The substantial similarity test therefore
has been incorporated into the exclusive right to prepare derivative works
without analyzing the impact of this test on authors' incentives or the public's
access to the work.
69. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 17, at 34-39 (stating that derivative works
are dissimilar from original work); Goldstein, supra note 4, at 231-32 (arguing
that courts need to take into consideration differences that necessarily exist
between original work and derivative work). This is the same problem con-
fronted in every case involving derivative works, because the alleged infring-
ing work is necessarily different from the preexisting work. See, e.g., Atari,
Inc. v. North Am. Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F. 2d 607, 619-20 (7th Cir.) (find-
ing infringement of video game audiovisual display), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642
F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding infringement of dolls by bubble
gum cards); Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 579 (D. Mass. 1985) (finding
infringement of copyrighted book by computer program); SAS Inst. v. S & H
Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 830-31 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (finding infringe-
ment of structure of program).
70. 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
71. Id. at 615-16.
72. Id. at 610-13.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 613.
75. Id. at 615; see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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differ in many respects from the preexisting work.7 6 Thus, the
court recognized that in a derivative work case, the works are
necessarily dissimilar.7
The court next confronted the complexities of the
idea/expression dichotomy and, on this basis, refused to find
substantial similarity, concluding that the defendant had appro-
priated only the idea of the program.7 8 The court found simi-
larities in the general structure and organization of the two
programs, but concluded that the structure and organization of
the program were "ideas" and therefore could be freely appro-
priated.79 The court came to this conclusion despite the deci-
sions of other courts that the general organization and
structure of a program is protectable expression. 0 Thus, Q-Co
demonstrates the inconsistency that the idea/expression dichot-
omy creates in the application of the substantial similarity test
to derivative works cases involving computer software.,,
The courts in Vault and Q-Co refused to recognize the dif-
ferences between a claim of infringement of the exclusive right
to prepare derivative works and a claim of infringement of the
exclusive right of reproduction.8 2 A derivative work by its na-
ture is dissimilar to the original work and, therefore, using
"substantial similarity" as the basis of the test for infringement
of the exclusive right to prepare derivative works creates un-
certainty.8 3 The delineation of expression from idea that the
substantial similarity test requires enhances this uncertainty,
especially in the context of sophisticated computer programs.
As discussed above, the Midway court used an analysis of the
76. Id.
77. Id. This inherent dissimilarity stems from the dual function of a de-
rivative work. Derivative works raise issues of copyrightability as well as in-
fringement. For example, a derivative works case can arise when a work is
based upon work in the public domain. The question that arises is whether
there are enough dissimilarities between the works to meet the originality re-
quirement of the copyright law. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300,
304-05 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that requirement of originality, if interpreted too
liberally in derivative works context, would inhibit creation of derivative
works); see also Brown, supra note 4, at 4-6 (discussing Gracen and its ominous
implications for expansion of copyright law through exclusive right to prepare
derivative works).
78. Q-Co, 625 F. Supp. at 615-16.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. This wide disparity is a re-
sult of the ambiguity of the idea/expression dichotomy.
82. See supra note 1.
83. See supra note 69.
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economic impact of the infringing derivative work on the mar-
ket of the original work in order to determine infringement.8 4
The following section analyzes and discusses the reasons why a
test based on market analysis is more consistent with the pur-
poses of copyright law.
II. THE UNCERTAINTY CREATED BY USING A
TRADITIONAL SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY ANALYSIS
AS A TEST FOR INFRINGEMENT OF THE EXCLUSIVE
RIGHT TO PREPARE DERIVATIVE WORKS
The proper starting point for any analysis of copyright law
is the purpose of copyright: to advance the progress of science
and the useful arts by granting authors a limited monopoly in
their works.8 5 The traditional substantial similarity test of in-
fringement, as applied to derivative works, fails to promote this
purpose because its vagueness prevents authors from predicting
the extent of protection copyright law offers.86 This unpredict-
ability causes a decline in the number of copyrighted works,
thwarting the purpose of copyright law.8 7 Using market analy-
sis to define the idea/expression dichotomy and adjusting the
84. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
85. U.S. CONsT. art. I., § 8, cl. 8; see Goldstein, supra note 4, at 217 (ad-
monishing that analysis of copyright issues must be based in purpose of copy-
right); see also Abrans, supra note 6, at 1120 (stating that United States
copyright system is based on balance between incentive to authors and public
access); Hurt & Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56:2 AM.
ECON. REV. 421, 423 (1966) (noting that other copyright systems justify protec-
tion based on moral rights of author).
86. For a discussion of the traditional substantial similarity test, see supra
notes 38-45 and accompanying text; see also Note, Toward a Unified Theory of
Copyright Infringement for an Advanced Technological Era, 96 HARV. L. REV.
450, 464 (1982) (arguing that substantiality of copying is not proper inquiry
when there is commercial interaction between words).
87. See Conley & Bryan, supra note 26, at 608-12 (suggesting that substan-
tial similarity should not be sole determinant of infringement, and proposing
examination of economic impact); Goldstein, supra note 4, at 227 (arguing that
derivative rights affect level of investment in original works). Other commen-
tators have discussed the problems of not providing adequate copyright protec-
tion. See, e.g., Goldstein, The Private Consumption of Public Goods: A
Comment on Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 21 BuLL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 204, 209 (1973) (stating that extensive photocopying may reduce sub-
scriptions to journals and result in authors investing their resources else-
where); Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 85, at 430-31 (discussing welfare effect
of copyright and concluding that some literary works will not be produced
without proper copyright protection); Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Ap-
propriability: Photocopying of Journals, 93 J. POL. ECON. 945, 948-49 (1985)
(stating that inability of copyright owners to prevent copying will eliminate
appropriability of work).
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substantial similarity test to take account of the inherent dis-
similarities of derivative works can reduce this uncertainty.88
A. THE UNCERTAINTY CREATED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL
SIMILARITY TEST REDUCES AUTHORS' INCENTIVES AND
INHIBITS INNOVATION
An author produces a work to gain the rewards of the crea-
tive process that copyright law generally protects.8 9 Authors of
software are no different, but Congress only recently extended
copyright law to protect an author's investment in developing
computer software.90 One of the protections Congress grants
88. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text. There is other support
for the proposition that the substantial similarity test is not functioning prop-
erly, and that some other analysis may be proper. Some courts deal with de-
rivative works cases by attempting to redefine the idea/expression dichotomy.
See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1224-27
(3d Cir. 1986) (involving two computer programs written in different language
and for different computers, but not addressing derivative works issue), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1131 (1987); Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 581 (D. Mass.
1985) (finding that computer program based upon copyrighted book was in-
fringement of exclusive right to prepare derivative works); Q-Co Indus. v.
Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (distingiushing SAS); SAS
Inst. v. S. & H. Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 830-31 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (in-
volving two computer programs for different computers and discussing deriva-
tive works issue). If the substantial similarity test adequately found
infringement in the cases involving derivative works, there would be no need
for the courts to redefine the idea/expression dichotomy.
89. There are many other possible reasons, such as self-fulfillment, that
induce an author to produce literary or artistic works. Authors still create the
majority of copyrighted works today, however, for the pecuniary rewards they
offer. See Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 85, at 426 (stating that pecuniary
gain is essential to creation of some works). Some commentators also argue
that copyright is not the best way to provide incentive and that subsidies and
lead time may be more effective. See Abrams, supra note 6, at 1121 (arguing
that public benefit from copyright grants of monopoly is perhaps most rele-
vant issue in copyright law); Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 85, at 427 (noting
substantial advantage of being first in publishing industry). Lead time also is
of substantial value in the computer software industry, because of the high ob-
solescence rate. See infra note 103. Copyright protection for software conse-
quently need not be as extensive as in some other areas. Lead time can be
threatened only by copying the source code, because appropriation of anything
more abstract requires a substantial investment of resources to make the pro-
gram competitive. Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PITT.
L. REV. 1037, 1080-81 (1986) (arguing that the more valuable the source code,
the longer independent creation will take). As long as the source code is pro-
tected, the incentive to the original author will remain intact. See infra notes
144-52 and accompanying text.
90. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5667 (including computer programs, as de-
fined by 17 U.S.C. § 101, within subject matter category of literary works).
Granting copyright protection, however, has not resolved the problems for the
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authors is the exclusive right to prepare derivative works. 91
The extent of this exclusive right is well settled for authors of
literary works, but authors of computer software cannot rely
on this exclusive right because of the uncertainty the substan-
tial similarity test creates. 92
The substantial similarity test, as applied to the exclusive
right to prepare derivative works, results in inconsistent and
uncertain protection for computer software. 93 This inconsis-
tency results from three sources. Derivative works are by defi-
nition dissimilar, and often are in a form different from the
original.94 Consequently, the similarities from the outset are
few. The next complicating factor is the requirement that the
infringing work must be substantially similar to the original at
the idea level as well as in its expression.95 Finally, when the
above difficulties are combined with the highly technical nature
of computer software, the substantial similarity test becomes
very difficult for even the most sophisticated fact finders to ap-
computer software industry. The copyright law is designed to apply to works
of fine art; courts therefore have difficulty applying the idea/expression di-
chotomy and the substantial similarity test to computer software. See Note,
supra note 23, at 1268-84 (discussing development of copyright protection for
computer software).
91. See supra note 1.
92. Some may argue that the exclusive right to prepare derivative works
is not well settled for literary works either. The language of the statute, how-
ever, is much clearer with respect to literary works. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
For instance, the statute lists some specific examples of derivative works of lit-
erary works such as movies and dramatizations. Id. The Act does not include
similar language regarding computer software, and thus the courts must inter-
pret the broad language "works based upon the copyrighted work" to deter-
mine if there is an infringement. Id. § 106(2). The courts are forced to do the
basic policy analysis and set the proper scope of protection for computer
software. Also, the case law involving literary derivative works is much more
extensive than the computer software case law. See supra part I(A).
Uncertainty in the computer software field results from the reliance of
some courts on derivative works cases involving literary works as controlling
law. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267 (5th Cir.
1988) (relying on Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984)
(finding no infringement of play from movie and relying solely on substantial
similarity), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985)). Other courts have not followed
this analysis. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. v. Artic Int'l, 704 F.2d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir.)
(finding infringement by relying on economic impact and not on substantial
similarity), cert denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). There is no clear consensus re-
garding application of the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, and this
creates uncertainty.
93. See supra note 57.
94. See supra note 69.
95. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
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ply consistently.96 The uncertainty that the substantial similar-
ity test creates in this situation 'thwarts the purpose of
copyright law because it reduces authors' incentive to create
new works with no corresponding increase in public access. 97
This reduction in incentive stems from the impact of un-
certainty of protection on an author's decision to invest the
time and resources necessary to create a particular program.
Pecuniary considerations may not always be paramount in the
decision to create traditional copyrightable subject matter such
as books, songs, or paintings,9 but the production of computer
software is big business.99 Computer software companies use
traditional management decision techniques in deciding
whether to pursue a project. 100 The companies examine the po-
tential market for the software, gauge the revenues that the
software will generate, and weigh these revenues against the
costs of producing the software.1 1 Projects that do not produce
revenues at least equal to the costs of the project are
rejected.102
Ascertaining the costs and revenues of a project is difficult,
however, when the copyright law ambiguously defines the ex-
96. Most courts deciding cases involving computer software recognize the
need for expert testimony. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
97. Reduced protection from infringement results in a corresponding in-
crease in the public's access to that work. See supra note 85. In this situation,
however, the risk created by the unpredictability of infringement negatively
affects both the author's protection and the willingness of third parties to use
the copyrighted work as a stepping stone to further creativity. See infra notes
103-22 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 89.
99. Both the software and hardware industries have experienced dramatic
growth. In 1984, sales of turnkey computer systems approached $20 billion.
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER LAW 329 (1985).
100. Such techniques involve discounting the future cash flows from a pro-
posed project and weighing this value against the present value of the cash
outflows necessary to sustain the project. See generally J. WESTON & E. BRIG-
HAM, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE 255-343 (5th ed. 1979) (outlining
investment analysis models). The same techniques are used when analyzing a
software investment decision. See N. STATLAND, CONTROLLING SOFTWARE DE-
VELOPMENT 134-36 (1986) (discussing need to balance costs against benefits of
software development).
101. A rational decision maker will not proceed when the costs of the pro-
ject are greater than the rewards. The concept of a rational producer man-
dates that the decision to invest in a particular project depends upon the
returns expected. See KOHLER, INTERMEDIATE MICROECoNOMIcS 8-9 (1982)
(explaining that rational behavior consists of choosing among alternatives that
will enhance welfare).
102. Id.
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clusive right to prepare derivative works.10 3 The uncertainty
created by the substantial similarity test is a form of risk that
the software producer must consider when deciding whether to
make an investment in software. 0 4 This risk reduces the po-
tential revenue of the project and increases the cost of develop-
ment by chilling programmers from using existing works as
stimulation for the innovative process. 0 5 This impact on the
revenues and costs of the potential project reduces the number
of copyrightable programs. Therefore, the substantial similar-
ity test as applied in this context does not serve the purpose of
copyright law. 0 6
Regardless of the level of protection Congress intended to
extend to software authors, an uncertain infringement standard
dictates that the intended monopoly will not be achieved be-
cause of the impact that risk has on the projected revenues of
the project.'0 7 For example, assume two copyright systems,
103. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. Another complicating
factor is the high obsolescence rate of computer technology. PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 99, at 348 (noting problem of obsolescence). The shorter
the life span of the technology, the lower the amount of revenue that can be
generated.
104. Many scholars have considered the decision making process. See, e.g.,
Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return! Concepts and Evi-
dence, 30 FIN. ANAL. J. 68 (1984), reprinted in V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN,
CORPORATE FINANCE 93-101 (3d ed. 1987) (proposing use of Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model); W. LEWELLEN, THE COST OF CAPITAL (1969), reprinted in V.
BRUDNEY & M. CHIREISTEIN, supra, at 57-64 (discussing impact of risk on in-
vestment decisions); J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE (4th ed.
1972), reprinted in V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra, at 64-69 (same).
105. See infra notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
106. The 1976 Copyright Act provides copyright owners with a cause of ac-
tion for infringement of their exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1982). This
cause of action allows the copyright owner to protect the investment in the
copyrighted work. Even if others may independently create a competing pro-
gram, the author is protected from competitors who do not incur the substan-
tial costs of initial development. See Abrams, supra note 6, at 1121 n.4 (stating
that copyright protection is necessary to offset high initial costs of production
that copiers necessarily do not incur); Conley & Bryan, supra note 26, at 596
(stating that competitors can save time and money by relying on original au-
thor's work). This protection makes the revenue stream more predictable and
makes investment in software more available.
107. Some argue that the exclusive right to prepare derivative works ex-
tends no additional protection to authors. See supra note 2. But see supra
note 4. These authors follow the Litchfield rationale and argue that the exclu-
sive right to prepare derivative works does not protect against copying that is
not substantially similar. Even if one accepts this proposition as the true con-
gressional intent, it still follows that the inherent uncertainty of the test as ap-
plied to computer software cases involving derivative works inhibits software
producers. This proposition can be demonstrated mathematically. An invest-
ment's value is calculated as:
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each attempting to extend to authors the same level of protec-
tion. One of the systems has exclusive rights that are unambig-
uous and allow the software producer to ascertain with near
certainty the revenue that a program will generate. 0 8 In this
case, the software producer knows the level of protection Con-
gress intended and therefore can proceed with certainty toward
investment.1 09
The second system's scope of protection is more ambigu-
ous. 1 0  The software producer faces different possible out-
comes, each with a different probability of occurrence.' Even
N Rt - Ct
PV= x
t=i (1 + r)t
Rt = the revenue earned in each period
Ct = the costs incurred in each period
r = the discount rate
To compensate for risk, the discount rate is adjusted upward for increased va-
riability in revenues and downward for increased variability in costs. Those
adjustments reduce the present value of the investment, thereby reducing in-
centive to produce the software. A common measure of risk is the standard
deviation of returns, which is calculated as follows:
= Pi (Ri- Re)2
where:
Pi = the probability of each individual occurrence
Ri = each possible revenue outcome (net of costs)
Re = the expected value calculated as follows:
Re = I (Pi X Ri).
The higher the standard deviation of investment outcomes, the higher the
risk. As risk increases, the discount rate also must increase, thereby reducing
the value of a given investment. Thus, risk adversely affects the level of in-
vestment and defeats congressional intent. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIREL-
STEIN, supra note 104, at 64-69 (discussing measure of risk and incorporating
their measures into investment decision); F. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF
MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 93-94 (1986) (discussing measures
of risk).
108. Such a system is impossible, but consideration of an ideal in contrast
to the current system is a valuable aid in analysis. Perfect information is re-
quired for a competitive market. Failure of perfect information is a form of
market failure, and one justification for intervention. See Note, Eigibility for
Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV.
579, 598 (1985) (discussing market failure in context of copyright protection).
An unambiguous copyright law improves competitiveness in markets for copy-
righted Works.
109. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
110. The divergence of recent cases demonstrates the ambiguity of the ex-
clusive right to prepare derivative works in the context of computer software.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
111. When more than one outcome is possible, it is necessary to attach a
probability to each outcome. For example, consider three levels of protection:
high, intermediate, and low. Assume that each of these levels of protection
translates into, $100,000, $75,000, and $50,000 of return on investment respec-
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assuming that the weighted probable revenue stream predicted
by the software producer covers the same markets that Con-
gress intended to protect, the possibility that courts will nar-
rowly construe an ambiguous standard increases the risk of
investment and reduces its value.112 Investors will prefer an in-
vestment that produces a certain cash flow of $100,000 over a
risky investment that returns $100,000. Risk averse investors
thus consider the less risky investment more promising.113
In summary, the vagueness of the substantial similarity
test as currently applied by most courts makes results uncer-
tain and unpredictable. This unpredictability renders invest-
ment in copyrighted software more risky and less valuable.
Software developers will reject some projects because they will
be unable to predict whether the potential revenues will exceed
development costs. This results in fewer copyrighted works.114
Such a result conflicts starkly with copyright law's objective to
promote creation of copyrightable works.115
The uncertainty inherent in the application of the substan-
tively. In other words, each level of protection extends the software pro-
ducer's monopoly into more markets and results in more revenue. The
ambiguity in the test for infringement of the exclusive right to prepare deriva-
tive works allows for a range of possibilities. To establish what the probable
outcome will be, the producer must attach a probability to each of the possible
outcomes. The probability established will depend upon perceived trends in
recent cases, the nature of the program, and whether there is related prece-
dent. If the established probability of protection is 25%, 60%, and 15% respec-
tively, then the probable revenue stream is $77,500. Even assuming that the
unambiguous copyright system generates the same level of investment, the
risk inherent in the unpredictable system makes investment less likely. See
supra note 107 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 107.
113. See, e.g., V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 104, at 58-65 (dis-
cussing risk aversion of investors).
114. This statement has two implications. First, it recognizes that a deriva-
tive work is dependent on a preexisting work. Second, a derivative work adds
original authorship to the preexisting work. But for the fact that the author is
taking the expression of a preexisting work without permission, the author of
the derivative work could obtain copyright protection for the original portion
added. See NIMIMER, supra note 2, § 809 (stating that derivative work would be
copyrightable but for lack of permission). A derivative work thus communi-
cates to society more information than a simple reproduction, and the copy-
right law needs to ensure that derivative works are produced. Copyright law
does this by granting authors the exclusive right to prepare derivative works.
This Note proposes that the best way to ensure that derivative computer pro-
grams are prepared is to determine whether the program's source code is mini-
mally similar. See infra notes 136-66 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. The argument that destruc-
tion of the incentive will reduce the total number of copyrighted works is not
novel. See Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 85, at 426 (stating that lack of in-
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tial similarity test to derivative works also alters the cost side
of the investment decision. 1 6 One purpose for granting authors
only a limited monopoly in a copyrighted work is to make that
work available to others for use in the creative process."17
Copyright laws should insure that others are free to take the
idea presented by a program and use it as a stepping stone to
their own creativity." s8 The copyright laws in this manner pro-
mote the progress of the sciences and useful arts.1' 9
As some software manufacturers find, however, this step-
ping stone process often leads to infringement. 20 Similar to
the effect of risk on potential revenues from a program, the
risk of infringing a copyright increases the cost of software pro-
duction.' 2 ' The vaguer the standard of infringement, the more
difficult it is for software producers to conform their activity to
the law. Software producers therefore must factor potential lit-
igation costs into the investment decision, resulting in increased
costs. 22 These increased costs, in turn, will further discourage
developers from producing some programs.
III. A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE THE UNCERTAINTY
THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST
CREATES
This Note proposes that the courts reduce uncertainty
caused by the substantial similarity test by establishing more
certain rules regarding infringement of the exclusive right to
centive will reduce number of copyrighted works); Note, supra note 86, at 465
(arguing that impairing incentive undermines purpose of copyright).
116. Viewing the problem from the cost side of the investment equation,
the investor worries about future litigation costs and about taking other
noncopyright protective procedures. See Davidson, supra note 89, at 1037 (sug-
gesting technique for analyzing competing software to avoid infringement);
Hazen, supra note 49, at 128-29 (offering contract as alternative method of pro-
tection against infringement from derivative works). A less ambiguous copy-
right act would eliminate the extra costs and potential litigation from these
procedures.
117. See supra notes 23-24, 90 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 28.
121. This conclusion follows the risk analysis presented for the predictabil-
ity of the potential revenue stream. See supra note 107. Risk from the possi-
ble occurrence of various possible costs requires downward adjustment of the
discount rate, increasing the present value of the costs of the project. The cost
variability results from the precautions taken to counteract the ambiguity of
the substantial similarity test. See supra note 116.
122. Even if the actual costs do not increase, the possibility of increased
costs makes the investment less desirable. See supra note 107.
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prepare derivative works.123 First, courts should use the costs
and revenues that a program generates as a guide to defining
the idea/expression dichotomy.12 4 Second, courts need to
reevaluate the substantial similarity test to take into considera-
tion the inherent dissimilarities of derivative works. 125 These
adjustments will increase the predictability of the copyright
laws and will better serve the purpose of copyright.
As noted earlier, the language of the Copyright Act of 1976
provides that the infringing derivative work must be "based
upon" the copyrighted work. 2 6 The statute does not define
based upon,127 and any test for infringement of the exclusive
right to prepare derivative works must begin by defining that
term. This proposal sets forth a method for proving that a
work is an infringing derivative work and, therefore, "based
upon" the preexisting work.
The first part of the proposed test follows the traditional
test for infringement employed in "copying" cases. 28 Because
independent creation of even an exact duplicate of a copy-
123. Bright line rules are advantageous because they offer predictability,
but problems result when courts are not free to consider exigent circum-
stances. The bright line rule proposed here, however, comports with the pur-
pose of copyright law. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text. But see
Hazen, supra note 49, at 116-17 (stating that bright line test is precluded by
vague language of statute).
124. This analysis follows the reasoning of Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l,
704 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). Midway de-
fined a derivative work as one that generates a significant demand. The court
applied the economic analysis because it is consistent with the purpose of copy-
right. Id.; see supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text. Because the
idea/expression dichotomy is simply a reflection of the purpose of copyright,
the economic analysis of Midway can be used as a tool to define the
idea/expression dichotomy. Use of economics is not new to copyright law. See
generally Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y
U.S.A. 253, 272-75 (1983) (advocating copyright law as remedy for market fail-
ure); Raskind, A Functional Interpretation of Fair Use: The Fourteenth Don-
ald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 31 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 601, 626-39
(1984) (applying economic analysis in fair use context); Comment, Fair Use in
Copyright Law and the Nonprofit Organization: A Proposal For Reform, 34
AMI. U.L. REV. 1327, 1363 (1985) (noting courts using economic theory in copy-
right cases).
125. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
126. The relevant sections of the Copyright Act of 1976 are § 106(2), grant-
ing the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, and § 101, defining a deriv-
ative work. See supra note 1; see also Conley & Bryan, supra note 26, at 609
(stating that "based upon" means that defendant used plaintiff's work and
that this use can be seen by examining works).
127. See supra note 25.
128. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
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righted work is not an infringement, the courts have required
some evidence of copying. 29 This requirement also applies in
derivative works cases. 130 Usually such an inquiry uses circum-
stantial evidence to raise an inference of copying because direct
proof is often unavailable. 13' When a plaintiff chooses to prove
copying through circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff first
must prove that the defendant had access to the copyrighted
work.132 The plaintiff next must prove sufficient similarity of
expression to raise an inference of unlawful copying.133 At this
point, the proposed test diverges from the traditional substan-
tial similarity test in order to reduce the uncertainty created by
that test in computer software cases involving derivative works.
In a traditional substantial similarity inquiry, a court first
must ascertain whether the alleged infringer appropriated the
protected expression of the work, as opposed to the unprotected
idea.134 Because the traditional idea/expression analysis is am-
biguous, especially in the context of computer technology, copy-
right law needs a more concrete method of ascertaining where
to strike the balance between incentive to authors and access to
the public.135
The analysis of Midway answered this need by using eco-
nomic analysis to decide whether there was an infringing deriv-
ative work. Derivative works cases involving computer
software can also use economic analysis to distinguish idea from
expression.136 Courts should classify that part of a work which
129. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222,
1231 (3d Cir. 1986) (copying must be proven), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
One of the major distinctions between copyright and patent law is that copy-
right does not prohibit independent creation. A subsequent independent in-
ventor of a patented work obtains no rights, and will be infringing the patent
if he manufactures and sells the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. IV
1986). A patent grants a more extensive monopoly than a copyright, but it is
much harder to obtain and lasts for only 17 years. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-104, 154
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Some commentators are concerned that copyright law
has been extending protection to ideas and, therefore, granting patent-like
protection without the requisite limitation on terms or obtainability. See
Brown, supra note 4, at 2.
130. See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (re-
quiring some form of copying in derivative works case), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1052 (1985).
131. See supra note 39.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The idea/expression dichotomy is an essential part of any analysis of
copyright infringement. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. The legislative history of
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will generate a significant demand as protected expression, and
should classify the rest as idea.137 Application of this test to
computer programs requires examination of the process of com-
puter software development.138
the Copyright Act of 1976 is scant, but it seems to support protection of the
parts of a work that will generate a significant demand and therefore will be
of value to the author. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 26, at 13; see also
Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U.
PIrrr. L. REV. 1185, 1212-15 (1986) (discussing legislative history of exclusive
right to prepare derivative works in context of computer software); supra
notes 10-26 and accompanying text (discussing history of copyright legislation).
A committee print for the House Committee on the Judiciary stated that "the
bill should, we believe, adopt a general approach aimed at providing compensa-
tion to the author for future as well as present uses of his work that materi-
ally affect the value of his copyright." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 26, at
13. Others have argued that the legislative history of the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works demonstrates that it was meant to expand the scope
of exclusive rights. See Conley & Bryan, supra note 26, at 609-10; Hazen,
supra note 49, at 117-18. But see Samuelson, supra, at 1213-14 (arguing that
exclusive right to prepare derivative works was meant only to refine and sim-
plify copyright, not to expand scope of exclusive rights).
137. This analysis is similar to the fair use doctrine. Copyright law pro-
vides that one can copy another's work if it is a "fair use." 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982). The primary factor in determining whether a use is a fair use is the
effect that the copying has upon the "potential market" of the copyrighted
work. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters, 471 U.S. 539, 566
(1983) (stating that effect upon potential market is most important factor);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp.
1031, 1036 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding that fair use did not exist because of effect
on potential market); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop
Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 358 (D. Ga. 1979) (emphasizing effect upon po-
tential market in finding that musical was infringement of book); New York
Times Co. v Roxburg Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 213, 223 (D.N.J. 1977)
(stating that competitive effect is important when dealing with compilations
and directories). If there is no harm to the potential market of the original
work, then generally there is a fair use and therefore no copyright infringe-
ment. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, 642 F. Supp. at 1036, (finding
that bubble gum cards depicting ugly children not fair use of "cabbage patch"
dolls); Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296, 1301-03 (D.D.C. 1985) (finding that
translation of newspaper article was not fair use). By relying primarily on the
impact on the potential market, the courts are extending protection to these
potential markets. Examining the "potential market" of a work is similar to
examining whether the software will generate a significant demand. Because
the source code generates a significant demand, if others are allowed to appro-
priate the source code, the appropriation affects the potential market of the
program and therefore results in an infringement.
138. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1229-
31 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing development process and citing to programming
resources), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); see also N. STATLAND, supra note
100, at 87-90 (discussing development of computer software systems); see gener-
ally R. ARMSTRONG, MODULAR PROGRAMMING IN COBOL (1973) (discussing
programming in COBOL computer language).
Hereinafter, reference to source code includes reference to the object code
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The program development process involves four steps: sys-
tems design, programming and program testing, system testing,
and maintenance. 139 Courts attempting to define the idea and
expression of computer software usually focus on the distinc-
tion between the systems design and programming phase.' 40 At
the systems design stage the overall structure and organization
of the system are defined, while at the programming stage this
general design is made more detailed and reduced to an opera-
tional product, the source code.' 4 ' The courts are split, some
holding that the overall structure and organization of the
software are protectable expression, and some holding that the
expression is limited to the source code. 142 One way of examin-
ing this problem is to look at the costs and revenues generated
at each stage of the process to determine the value of each
stage to the author and to the public.143
of the program. It is well settled that both the source and object code of a pro-
gram are copyrightable. See, e.g., Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone
Distributing Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 454-55 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (stating that both
source and object code are copyrightable).
139. Cf R. ARMSTRONG, supra note 138, at 7 (discussing program develop-
ment). There are sub-phases within each of these steps. Systems design en-
compasses a feasibility study, specification, analysis, and engineering of the
system. Id. At this stage an outline of the system is produced, which is nor-
mally expressed in the form of a flow chart. The flow chart specifies the flow
of data in and out of the system, but is in a general form, with further specifi-
cations left for the programming phase. See, e.g., N. STATLAND, supra note
100, at 64. The programming phase consists of making a detailed design of the
system, actual programming, and testing program and interface. See, e.g., id
at 64-65 (showing sample program design flow chart).
140. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Definition of the phases of
development is crucial to use of this analysis. Whelan, for example, may have
included the general organization and structure of the program within the am-
bit of protection because the experts defined the systems design stage very
broadly to include some programming functions. The Whelan court did not
mean that the structure and organization of the system is a general flow chart
of data flows, but rather the structure of individual subroutines within each
program. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230. This intermediate design/programming
function is more properly characterized as creation of source code. This is not
to imply that copying of the structure of subroutines will constitute infringe-
ment. There is the possibility, however, that similarity of subroutines can be
used as an indication of copying of the literal source code. Such a determina-
tion requires expert testimony. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 139.
142. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
143. Such an approach comports with the purpose of copyright law by bal-
ancing incentive to create with public access to the product of that creativity.
By protecting an author's investment in a program, the copyright laws provide
incentive to create. By allowing others access to the part of the work that does
not require a substantial resource commitment, the copyright laws allow
others to build upon the basic idea of the program. If the Copyright Act of
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The higher the cost of development at each stage, the more
valuable protection will be for the author, thereby increasing
the incentive to create.' 44 Costs usually peak toward the end of
the programming phase. 45 If copyright law does not extend
protection to the source code, others will be able to enter the
market with substantially less cost, therefore reducing the in-
centive to produce original source code.' 46 On the other hand,
copying the general system design will not create a competitive
advantage, because a competitor still must incur many of the
1976 protected the basic idea of the program, the program would be more valu-
able. The Copyright Act, however, prohibits such protection because of the re-
sulting restrictions on innovation. See supra note 46.
144. At a minimum, an author expects to recover the costs of producing a
program. See supra note 101. Thus, protection of these costs should be one of
the primary concerns of copyright law. Protection of the costs of production is
similar to the protection of the potential market in the fair use context. See
supra note 137.
145. R. ARMSTRONG, supra note 138, at 7. But see Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that development
of structure and organization of program is more costly than coding), cert de-
nied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); N. STATLAND, supra note 100, at 135 (stating that
systems design is most cost-intensive phase). Such conclusions, although not
necessarily at odds with the position of this Note, are a result of improper defi-
nition of the elements of system design. See supra note 140.
The overall structure and organization of a program is that part which can
be revealed by examining the input and output functions of the program, but
not by looking at the source code. The overall structure and organization of
the program can be ascertained by simply observing how the program operates
and interfaces with the user. This analysis follows that proposed in Davidson,
supra note 89, at 1082, for distinguishing between the idea and expression of a
program. Davidson suggests looking at a program as if it were a "black box."
Anything that can be ascertained by looking at the outside of the black box is
an idea, while anything that can be ascertained by looking inside the box is an
expression. Id. Davidson argues that the "black box" approach serves the pur-
pose of copyright because if what is inside is not very complex or original, in-
dependent creation will be swift. Id. at 1080-81. If, however, the inside of the
box is very complex, it will be more valuable, and the time of independent cre-
ation should be longer. Id. Davidson states that the requirement of independ-
ent creation is necessary to preserve the author's incentive. Id.
Even though substantial resources may go into the design of a program's
organization and structure, a programmer still must make additional substan-
tial investments to complete the program. The programmer must solve the
entire programming probl.em, and complete the coding, debugging, documenta-
tion, and maintenance. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231 n.21. This work is time-con-
suming and, given the short life span of most programs, the lead time
maintained by the original programmer is sufficient protection.
146. See Abrams, supra note 6, at 1121 n.4 (stating that common argument
for copyright protection is high initial cost of production not incurred by copi-
ers); Conley & Bryan, supra note 26, at 596 (stating that competitors will save
themselves time and money by relying on original author's work).
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costs to develop an operational product.1 4 7 Thus, examination
of the costs associated with development of the system design
and the source code indicates that protection should be limited
to the source code.
This conclusion also follows from examination of the reve-
nues that the relevant parts of a program will generate.148 The
value of a program derives from the future revenues that it will
produce. 49 The system design will not generate revenue from
consumers because it is not operational. 50 Other software de-
velopers will be reluctant to pay a substantial sum for the sys-
tem design because it will not give them much of a competitive
advantage. 15 1 Thus, the source code is the only part of the pro-
gram that will generate a significant demand. Therefore, under
this Note's proposed test, the source code merits the label of
"expression." 52
This conclusion results in more certain application of copy-
right law because little ambiguity exists in defining the literal
source code.1 5 3 Software producers will know that others are
free to create competing programs with a similar design and
that the revenue stream therefore will be restricted to the im-
mediate market the program enters.1 54 The immediate market
of the program is protected from lower cost producers because,
without being able to copy the source code, competitors will
147. Because the copier must invest substantial resources to complete the
program, the copier is more like an independent creator. See supra note 145.
This situation also demonstrates the dual nature of a derivative work, because
a derivative work can be copyrightable if the work incorporates substantial
differences from the original. See supra note 77.
148. This analysis is similar to that employed in Midway Mfg. Co. v Artic
Int'l, 704 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983); see
supra note 124.
149. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 104, at 33-39 (discussing
use of discounting future cash flows to determine value of investment).
150. The system does not become operational until after the programming
phase, and only at that time will the program be of value to the consumer. See
supra note 145.
151. See supra note 146.
152. See supra note 55.
153. In the case of derivative works, it may be difficult for a finder of fact
to determine whether the source code was copied. See infra note 158. This
problem does not exist for the copier, however, because the copier knows the
original source code and knows whether the changes are trivial. See infra
note 159.
154. Others have argued that the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works extends beyond the market the work first enters. See Goldstein, supra
note 4, at 234. This extension seems to be more appropriate for literary works,
however, than for computer software.
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have to incur substantial investment costs to produce a compet-
ing program.-5 5 Also, greater certainty will enable others to
use the program as a "stepping stone" in independent creation
because, as long as no source code is copied, they are not in dan-
ger of infringing another's copyright.156 Thus, the proposed ap-
proach reduces much of the uncertainty of the idea/expression
portion of the substantial similarity test, thereby making the
investment in software more certain.157
Because derivative works are dissimilar by definition, the
next problem is to ascertain whether the alleged derivative
work appropriated enough of the literal source code to be in-
fringing. Expert testimony is essential to aid the trier of fact in
ascertaining what the source code looks like. 5 8 Once this is de-
termined, the trier of fact can make a side-by-side comparison
of the two source codes.15 9
The trier of fact should look for any similarity. If none is
found, there can be no infringement. 160 If even minimal por-
tions of the source code are similar, however, courts should find
an infringement of the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works.16 ' The competitive advantage obtained by copying even
155. See supra note 145.
156. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
157. Reducing the uncertainty of application of the copyright laws helps in-
sure that the desired level of protection is realized. See supra note 107 and
accompanying text.
158. See Conley & Bryan, supra note 26, at 581-82; supra note 39. Deriva-
tive works, by definition, are adapted from the original and, therefore, they
may not seem similar to the ordinary observer. B. KAPLAN, supra note 17, at
34-39. Thus, experts are needed to elucidate the similarities between the
works. See supra note 43; see also Beutel, Modular Decomposition and the
Substantial Similarity Test: An Evidentiary Approach to Proof of Software
Design Piracy, COMPUTER LAWvYER, Oct. 1985, at 1, 13.
159. See supra text accompanying note 40. Conley and Bryan argue that
the exclusive right to prepare derivative works should be interpreted broadly
to cover those who copy the source code and then subsequently disguise it.
Conley & Bryan, supra note 26, at 596-97. Subsequent alterations are impor-
tant considerations, and expert testimony should be able to discover such situ-
ations. In such a case, the literal source code probably will have been copied,
and infringement will exist. Cf. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 130.03[B] (stating
that subsequent alterations will cure an infringement).
160. There must be copying of some of the expression in order for infringe-
ment to exist. See supra note 129. This conclusion is supported by the legisla-
tive history, which states that a derivative work must incorporate some
portion of the original for infringement to exist. H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 62, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659,
5675.
161. The purpose for requiring only minimal similarity is to create a deter-
rent against any copying of source code without permission. A competitor who
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minimal portions of source code is substantial, because copied
source code does not have to go through systems analysis, cod-
ing, or debugging.162 This competitive advantage directly cuts
into the original author's incentive to create, especially because
the obsolescence rate of software is very high.163 Thus, plain-
tiffs need show only minimal similarity to prove infringement
of the exclusive right to prepare derivative works.16
By requiring a finding of only minimal similarity, the pro-
posed approach makes the existence of infringement easier to
detect. The software industry will be put on notice that it can-
not copy source codes without obtaining the owner's permis-
sion.165 Such a bright-line test makes investment decisions
easier by making the costs and revenues of the investment
more certain.166
Application of the proposed test to prior cases involving de-
rivative works demonstrates how the test operates. In Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd. the defendants had access to
plaintiff's computer program and there was evidence that they
took some of the plaintiff's source code verbatim.167 Under the
proposed test, the alleged infringing program is "based upon"
the copyrighted program and thus violates the holder's exclu-
sive right to prepare derivative works.
wants to avoid the costs associated with creation of the source code can
purchase the right to use it from the original author. Such an approach will
allow the market, supported by the copyright law, to work out the value of the
source code between the two competitors.
This part of the test necessarily requires some discretion and is purely a
factual determination. Weight should be given to the relative importance of
the source code copied. See supra text accompanying note 44. This author be-
lieves that anything more than 10% of the total will be an infringement. More
than 10% similarity raises the inference that much more was copied, but that
it has been sufficiently disguised. In this case the copier escapes much of the
development cost and should not be allowed to compete with the original au-
thor, who incurred all of the investment cost.
162. Even assuming that most of the value of a program is in the system
design, copying of the source code includes copying the system design. Thus,
copying of the source code is appropriation of the original author's investment
and reduces the incentive to create.
163. Others often can independently create competing software in a short
period of time. Davidson, supra note 89, at 1081. If competitors also are al-
lowed to shorten the lead time by avoiding any of the costs of independent
creation, the original author's incentive is reduced.
164. If even minimal copying of source code can be shown, other unprov-
able copying often can be inferred.
165. Use of the market to value the software results in a more efficient al-
location of resources. See supra note 161.
166. See supra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
167. 847 F.2d 255, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1988).
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The fair use doctrine, however, provides the defendants
with a defense to the claim of infringement.168 The "unlock-
ing" program can be analogized to a criticism or parody of the
original work and thus falls within the fair use defense. 69 The
plaintiff is not expected to produce a program that will canni-
balize its own product, just as one is not likely to criticize one's
own artistic work.170 Thus, the result under both the tradi-
tional substantial similarity test and the proposed test is the
same. 171 Vault demonstrates that traditional copyright restric-
tions, such as the fair use doctrine, apply equally to derivative
works cases that employ the proposed derivative works test.
Q-Co Industries v. Hoffman presents a factual situation in
which the proposed test compels a finding of infringement, con-
trary to the result under the traditional substantial similarity
test applied by the court.17 2 In Q-Co the defendants had access
to the plaintiff's copyrighted source code, and there was evi-
dence that the defendants copied some of that code.' 73 Thus,
defendants created a teleprompter program that was based
upon plaintiff's copyrighted source code and therefore in-
fringed plaintiff's exclusive right to prepare derivative works.
There was evidence in Q-Co that defendants devoted sub-
stantial resources to the development of the new IBM tele-
168. The Copyright Act of 1976 codified the fair use defense:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
169. See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 234-35 (discussing fair use in context of
derivative works and relation to parodies).
170. This is the traditional argument for finding that parodies and critiques
are a fair use. Id.
171. The court in Vault applied the substantial similarity test and refused
to find infringement. Vault, 847 F.2d at 267-68; see supra note 68 and accompa-
nying text.
172. 625 F. Supp. 608, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (refusing to find infringement
without substantial similarity).
173. Id. at 614-15 (stating that there were textual similarities in codes).
The existence of even minimal similarities raises an inference that there was
much more copying than appears on the face of the documents, especially
when they are in different languages. See supra notes 158-61 and accompany-
ing text.
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prompter.174 Encouraging this type of activity serves the
purpose of copyright law. Therefore, a finding of infringement
seems to thwart that purpose. 7 5 A finding of infringement,
however, does not require the defendant to refrain from pro-
ducing or distributing its program. The proper remedy is to re-
quire the defendant to compensate the owner of the copyright
for the costs of development that were avoided by copying the
protected source code.' 7 6 The defendant should have avoided
the infringement action by contracting with the plaintiff for the
right to use the copyrighted source.177 By imposing a duty to
contract, the original author's investment is protected and sub-
sequent authors can improve on the original work, thereby
serving both purposes of copyright law.
CONCLUSION
The substantial similarity test in copyright law results in
ambiguity and uncertainty when applied to derivative works
cases involving computer software. This uncertainty makes an
investment in copyrightable software risky and therefore
reduces the level of investment. This result is contrary to the
purpose of the 1976 Copyright Act.
Courts can reduce the uncertainty of the substantial simi-
larity test by finding infringement of the exclusive right to pre-
pare derivative works when a defendant copies even minimal
portions of copyrighted source code. Examination of the mar-
ket for software indicates that strict protection of the source
code comports with the purpose of copyright by protecting the
original investment while allowing others to use the program as
a tool for innovation. The proposed test serves the purpose of
copyright by maintaining a balance between fostering incentive
to authors and preserving public access to the work, and by re-
ducing the uncertainty of the test for infringement.
Michael Wurzer
174. Q-Co, 625 F. Supp. at 612-13 (discussing substantial time and effort de-
fendants invested in creation of new program).
175. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text; see also Goldstein,
supra note 4, at 236-39 (arguing that infringement of exclusive right to prepare
derivative works requires different remedies from those normally awarded).
177. See Hazen, supra note 49, at 128-29 (suggesting use of contract to re-
duce uncertainty in area of derivative works).
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